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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature Of The Case
Carlos Malvin Navarrete appeals from his convictions for murder in the
second degree and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Carlos Navarrete and Irving Romero had been having problems getting along
with each other. (Tr., p.659, Ls.6-7; p.883, Ls.16-25.) 1 Just before noon on October
19, 2009, Navarrete, Jessie Salinas, and Mike Stolp drove together in a truck to
Holly Petersen's trailer in a Garden City mobile home park. (Tr., p.641, L.1 - p.642,
L.12; p.653, L.4 - p.655, L.1 O; p.903, L.15 - p.904, L.16.) Salinas got a gun from
the truck and handed it to Navarrete, who placed it in his waistband, and the three
men went inside the trailer where Romero and a woman were sleeping in the back
bedroom.

(Tr., p.648, Ls.5-9; p.664, Ls.2-17; p.665, Ls.7-15; p.1508, Ls.20-22.)

Navarrete asked Holly, who was "freaking out," whether there were any kids present,
and she told him her kids were there.

(Tr., p.672, L.2 - p.673, L.18.) However,

when Navarrete asked another woman, Elizabeth ("Liz") Chinea, whether any kids
were there, she told him "no." (Tr., p.673, Ls.20-21.)
Salinas went back outside and talked to Liz and Holly in the driveway for a
few minutes, and when he started to walk toward the front doors (main door and
screen door), the doors slammed open and Romero ran outside, hitting Salinas with
1

"Tr." refers to the trial transcript. Citations to other transcripts will be identified by
the date of the hearing transcribed.
1

his shoulder; at that moment, Navarrete, who was following Romero from inside the
trailer, shot Romero in the back, killing him.

(Tr., p.533, Ls.19-21; p.676, L.13 -

p.677, L.25; p.753, L.3 - p.754, L.8; p.927, L.14 - p.929, L.8; p.1509, L.6 - p.1510,
L. 15; p. 1511 , Ls. 12-1 8.)
Navarrete was charged with murder in the second degree and use of a
firearm during the commission of a crime.

(R., pp.90-91.)

Three days before

Navarrete's jury trial was scheduled to begin, his attorneys verbally requested a
continuance on the ground that the defense's alibi witness, Anthony Henderson, had
moved to California and refused to return phone calls, and "the only thing [the
defense] can do is use the statutory means of subpoenaing him out of state."
(6/25/10 Tr., p.4, Ls.14-16; p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.23.) However, while the parties were in
court, the district judge placed a phone call to Henderson in California, and he
denied that Navarrete was with him at his (Henderson's) house when Romero was
murdered. (6/25/10 Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.17; p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.6.) The district
court concluded that "Henderson does not appear to be an alibi witness" and denied
Navarrete's continuance request. (6/25/10 Tr., p.31, Ls.7-24.)
At trial, after Navarrete testified that he was with Henderson at Henderson's
home when Romero was murdered, the prosecutor asked him if he was present
during the hearing when Henderson was asked questions by the district judge over
speaker-phone.

(Tr., p.1470, L.19 - p.1472, L.20.)

The prosecutor then asked

Navarrete, "and he doesn't agree with you, does he?"

{Tr., p.1472, L.21.)

Navarrete's attorney objected to the question and, outside the presence of the jury,

2

stated "confrontation" and "hearsay" as the bases for the objection and moved for a
mistrial. (Tr., p.1472, L.22 - p.1476, L.15.) The prosecutor agreed that the question
was improper, and said that, inasmuch as the question was not answered, he would
withdraw it.

(Tr., p.1477, L.25 - p.1478, L.2.) The court noted the question was

being withdrawn by the prosecutor and denied Navarrete's motion for a mistrial.
(Tr., p.1478, Ls.3-5.) The court asked Navarrete's counsel how he wanted to treat
the improper question with regard to the jury, and counsel requested the jury be
instructed that the "last question asked by the prosecutor is excluded," and that it be
stricken. (Tr., p.1478, Ls.8-16.) When the jury returned to the courtroom, the district
court instructed the jury that the prosecutor's last question "is stricken from the
record, so you are not to give it any consideration." (Tr., p.1478, L.24 - p.1479, L.7.)
The jury found Navarrete guilty of murder in the second degree and the
firearm enhancement. (R., pp.176-177.) The district court sentenced Navarrete to
indeterminate life with thirty years fixed (R., pp.182-185), from which Navarrete
timely appealed (R., pp.186-189).

3

ISSUES

Navarrete states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Navarrette's motion for a continuance? 2

2.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Navarrette's motion
for a mistrial?

(Appellant's Brief, p.6.)
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
1. Has Navarrete failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
denied his motion for a continuance of the trial?
2. Has Navarrete failed to show that the district court erred by denying his motion
for a mistrial?

2

On appeal, Navarrete's counsel spells his client's name as "Navarrette." The state
opts to use the spelling adopted by the district court.
4

ARGUMENT

I.
Navarrete Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Denied His Motion For A Continuance Of The Trial
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Navarrete's motion for a continuance because, as

the court determined after questioning Henderson over speaker-phone in open
court, Henderson was not able to provide Navarrete with the alibi that Navarrete was
with Henderson at Henderson's house when the murder occurred. 3

(6/25/10 Tr.,

p.30, L.6 - p.31, L.13.) On appeal, Navarrete asserts the district court abused its
discretion and failed to reach its decision through the exercise of reason because:
(1) the unsworn telephonic statements by Henderson to the court should be viewed
with greater scrutiny than sworn testimony, and (2) Henderson had reasons for not
wanting to get involved in the trial - he had recently moved to California with his
family and he was engaged in drug rehabilitation. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Based
on those contentions, Navarrete argues it was "very possible" Henderson would
have become cooperative again if he had been subpoenaed and brought back to
Idaho to testify at trial. (Id.)
Application of the relevant law to the facts of this case, however, shows that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Navarrete's motion for a
continuance because he failed to demonstrate Henderson could provide testimony

3

At the June 25, 2010 hearing, when asked what Henderson had told defense
counsel, counsel responded, "He's told us that Mr. Navarrete was with him at the
time of the murder." (6/25/10 Tr., p.10, Ls.20-23.)
5

material to Navarrete's alibi defense and that his defense was prejudiced by the
court's ruling.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a continuance rests within the sound discretion

of the trial court. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21,981 P.2d 738,746 (1999); State
v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996). "Unless an
appellant shows that his substantial rights have been prejudiced by reason of a
denial of his motion for continuance, appellate courts can only conclude that there
was no abuse of discretion." Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 21, 981 P.2d 738, 746 (1999)
(citing State v. Laws, 94 Idaho 200,203,485 P.2d 144, 147 (1971)). See also State
v. Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 762, 932 P.2d 881, 885 (1997); State v. Hudson, 129
Idaho 478, 481, 927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996).
"Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial
and competent evidence. Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to
be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within
the discretion of the trial court." State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, 128, 233 P.3d 52,
59 (2010) (citing State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009)).

C.

Navarrete Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
In Denying His Motion To Continue His Jury Trial
To prevail on his appellate claim that the district court abused its discretion by

denying his motion for a continuance, Navarrete must demonstrate that his
substantial rights were prejudiced by having to proceed to trial as scheduled. Evans,
6

129 Idaho at 762, 932 P.2d at 885. "Trial judges necessarily require a great deal of
latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their problems is that of assembling the
witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time, and this burden
counsels against continuances except for compelling reasons." State v. Carman,
114 Idaho 791, 793, 760 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoted in State v. Cagle, 126
Idaho 794, 797, 891 P.2d 1054, 1057 (Ct. App. 1995)).
A defendant who moves for a continuance on the ground of absent witnesses
is required to give the names of his proposed witnesses and show: what facts he
intends to prove by them; that the witness is not absent by his procurement or
consent; that the witness' testimony is material to his defense; that he has used
diligence in attempting to procure his attendance at the trial; and a reasonable
probability that he can and will procure the witness's attendance if the continuance is
granted.

State v. Waggoner, 124 Idaho 716, 722-23, 864 P.2d 162, 168-69 (Ct.

App. 1993) (quoting State v. Mcclurg, 50 Idaho 762, 779, 300 P. 898 (1931),
overruled on other grounds, State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 65 P.2d 156 (1937)).

An abuse of discretion will not be found where the party requesting the continuance
does not show these criteria. See State v. Lopez, 107 Idaho 826, 693 P.2d 472 (Ct.
App. 1984) (affirming trial court's denial of motion for continuance where defendant
made no showing of a reasonable probability that he would procure the attendance
of the witnesses if granted a continuance). Likewise, an appellant must show that
the denial of the motion resulted in prejudice. State v. Hudson, 129 Idaho 478, 481,
927 P.2d 451, 454 (Ct. App. 1996).

7

Here, Navarrete's attorney did not make any attempt, apart from his initial
offer of proof, to show that Henderson would have provided testimony material to
Navarrete's alibi defense.

Navarrete's offer of proof quickly dissipated when the

district court judge decided to call Henderson, who was in California, while the
parties were in the courtroom. (6/25/10 Tr., p.24, L.25 - p.25, L.17.) That phone
call resulted in the following colloquy between the judge and Henderson over
speaker-phone:
THE COURT: Mr. Henderson, I really appreciate you taking time to
talk to me, and I know it's hard for you to do that. I need to ask you a
question.
Mr. Navarrete believes that you would say to the jury at the time
of the alleged murder that you and Mr. Navarrete were together at your
house. Are you going to be saying that? Would you say that to the
jury, or not?
MR. HENDERSON: Well, at this point, I'm not saying anything. So I
don't want to be involved with this anymore.
THE COURT: Okay, you've got to answer the question. You've got to
answer the question. You've got to tell me, is that a true statement, or
is it not a true statement, that you and Mr. Navarrete were together at
his house at the time of the alleged murder - at your house? Excuse
me. Let me ask you the question again, and answer yes or no.
Were you and Mr. Navarrete together at your house at the time
of the alleged murder? Can you answer that yes or no?
MR. HENDERSON: No, we weren't.
THE COURT: I'm sorry. What did you say?
MR. HENDERSON: I said no.
THE COURT: And that would be your testimony before the jury?
MR. HENDERSON: Yep. Yes, that is correct.
8

(6/25/10 Tr., p.28, L.1 - p.29, L.6.)

After Henderson told the court that he and

Navarrete were not together at Henderson's house at the time of the murder
(6/25/10 Tr., p.28, L.21 - p.29, L.6), Navarrete opted not to ask Henderson any
follow-up questions (6/25/10, p.29, Ls. 7-9). Having heard directly from Henderson
about what his trial testimony would be, the court concluded that "Henderson does
not appear to be an alibi witness" and denied Navarrete's request to continue in
order to compel Henderson's presence. (6/25/10 Tr., p.31, Ls.7-24.) Further, the
prosecutor told the court he had evidence supporting Henderson's assertion that
Navarrete was not with him at the time of the murder - a recorded jail phone call
from an inmate to Henderson about the time of the murder, in which Henderson said
he had been home alone. The prosecutor told the court:
This alibi witness, Mr. Henderson, I'll represent to the court that the
state has a phone call from another person in the jail to Mr. Henderson
at about noon on the day the homicide occurs, so this is right after the
911 call. This is during the time that Mr. Navarrete has affirmatively
represented that he's at Mr. Henderson's house.
Mr. Henderson tells this other person in the jail that he's home
alone; that there was a third male at the home earlier in the morning,
but that he's there by himself. There's no mention of Mr. Navarrete.
(6/25/10 Tr., p.8, L.24 - p.9, L.11.)
Navarrete argues on appeal that Henderson's telephonic statements to the
court should be viewed with greater scrutiny than if he had provided sworn
testimony, and because he did not want to return to Idaho to testify at trial, he may

9

not have been truthful when he said he could not provide Navarrete with an alibi. 4
(Appellant's Brief, pp.10-11.) Navarrete cites no authority to suggest that the trial
judge was not entitled to fully consider Henderson's unsworn answers to her direct
questions in order to determine whether he could provide alibi testimony for
Navarrete.
Navarrete's assertion that, if Henderson had been subpoenaed and came
back to Idaho, once he got here, "it is very possible that [Henderson] would have
become cooperative again" (Appellant's Brief, p.11 ), is wholly conjectural. The fact
that it would have inconvenienced Henderson to return to Idaho does not mean, as
Navarrete suggests, that Henderson was not truthful with the court when he denied
Navarrete was with him at Henderson's house when the murder occurred just to
4

Navarrete asserts he could have impeached Henderson if he had been allowed
more time to subpoena him to trial. (Appellant's Brief, p.11.) Navarrete argues the
jury could have "decided whether Mr. Navarrete had an alibi" based upon
impeachment of Henderson. Navarrete appears to incorrectly suppose that such
impeachment of Henderson could have been used as substantive proof of
Navarrete's alibi. The Idaho Court of Appeals explained in State v. Hayes, 144
Idaho 574, 578, 165 P.3d 288, 292 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Marsh, 141
Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (Ct. App. 2004)):
Substantive testimony may be distinguished from
evidence as follows:

impeachment

Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the
purpose of persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a
proposition on which the determination of the tribunal is
to be asked, impeachment is that which is designed to
discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his
testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains
why the jury should not put faith in him or his testimony.
10

avoid the inconvenience.

It is just as likely, as the prosecutor suspected, that

Henderson may have been reluctant to testify because he was "feeling some
pressure from people in the jail and those associated with him" to say that Navarrete
was at his house at the time of the murder when, in fact, he was not. (6/25/10 Tr.,
p.9, Ls.12-21.)
Despite the superficial concerns Navarrete now voices about the reliability of
Henderson's statements to the court, he has failed to show that the court abused its
discretion by finding Henderson was not an alibi witness. See Munoz, 149 Idaho at
128, 233 P.3d at 59 ("Findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if they are supported
by substantial and competent evidence.

Decisions regarding the credibility of

witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting evidence, and factual inferences to be
drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court."). Because the district court
was told by Henderson several days before trial that he would not testify Navarrete
was with him at his (Henderson's) house at the time of the murder, and because the
state had a jail recording in which Henderson stated, at the time of the murder, he
was at home "there by himself," the court did not abuse its discretion in determining
Henderson was not an alibi witness.

Stated differently, because Henderson's

anticipated testimony was not material to Navarrete's alibi defense, but was instead
contrary to it, the district court properly denied his motion to continue the trial.
Waggoner, 124 Idaho at 722-23, 864 P.2d at 168-69.
Because Navarrete has failed to demonstrate any error in the district court's
finding that Henderson was not an alibi witness, he has necessarily also failed to

11

demonstrate that his substantial rights were prejudiced by having to proceed to trial
as scheduled. Evans, 129 Idaho at 762, 932 P.2d at 885;

see State v. Averett, 142

Idaho 879, 889, 136 P.3d 350, 360 (Ct. App. 2006). Testimony by Henderson that
he was alone at his own home during the time the murder took place elsewhere
would not have assisted Navarrete's attempt to show he was not present when the
murder occurred.

Navarrete has failed to show that the district court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to continue the jury trial.

11.
Navarrete Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred By Denying His Motion For
Mistrial
A.

Introduction
As discussed, the district court denied Navarrete's motion to continue the jury

trial after it placed an in-court telephone call to Henderson, who denied Navarrete
was with him at Henderson's house when Irving Romero was murdered. At trial,
after Navarrete testified that he went to Henderson's house at 225 Boise Avenue at
about 10:45 a.m. on October 19, 2009, and stayed there until about 1 :15 p.m. 5 (Tr.,
p.1470, L.21 - p.1471, L.25), the following colloquy took place during his crossexamination:
Q:

Now [Henderson's] in California, right?

A:

Yes.

5

It should be recalled that Romero was mortally shot in the back at about 11 :40
a.m. on October 19, 2009. (Tr., p.400, L.11 - p.401, L.9; p.476, L.24 - p.477, L.1; p.
555, L.8 - p.556, L.11.)
12

Q:
You were present with all of us - well, with your counsel and
myself and [the co-prosecutor] and the court staff, when there was a
hearing about whether we'd have this trial now or move this trial so that
you could try to get [Henderson] back from California; is that fair?
A:

Yes.

Q:

And in order to do that we had a speakerphone with

[Henderson], right?
A:

Yes.

Q:
And did the court have some questions with him about where he
was on this particular day on the 19th of October?
A:

That the what?

Q:

The 19th of October?

A.

Did who have questions?

Q.

The court.

A.

Yes.

Q.

And he doesn't agree with you, does he?

[By Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor.
(Tr., p.1472, Ls.1-22 (emphasis added).) After the jury was excused, Navarrete's
attorney explained:
It's a hearsay confrontation objection concerning that.
It's
sufficient to say that [Henderson] refuses to come up here, but what
[Henderson] said on the phone? I mean it's one thing to say that the
man won't come up here; it is quite another to say that - the content of
what he said to you.
(Tr., p.1473, Ls.12-18.) The prosecutor agreed that the hearsay objection was welltaken and told the court, "[i]f you want to instruct the jury to strike that comment,
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that's fine" (Tr., p.1474, Ls.11-18), and he would "move to a different subject" (Tr.,
p.1474, Ls.23-24). The prosecutor also explained that he had not intended to ask
Navarrete exactly what Henderson said.

(Tr., p.1474, Ls.14-16.)

Navarrete's

attorney moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's last question to Navarrete.
(Tr., p.1476, Ls.8-17.) The prosecutor then withdrew his question, and pointed out
that Navarrete had not answered it. (Tr., p.1477, L.25 - p.1478, L.2.) The district
court denied Navarrete's motion for a mistrial, and asked Navarrete's attorney how
he wanted to treat the improper question.

(Tr., p.1478, Ls.3-10.)

Counsel

responded, "I want you to say the last question asked by the prosecutor is excluded"
(Tr., p.1478, Ls.11-12), and:
Stricken from the record and they're not to consider it.
motion to strike, I suppose. That's the appropriate way.

It's a

(Tr., p.1478, Ls.14-16.)
When the jury re-entered the courtroom, the judge instructed it as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, the last question asked by the
prosecutor before I excused you from the courtroom you are to - that
question is stricken from the record, so you are not to give it any
consideration. Thank you.
(Tr., p.1479, Ls.3-8.)

The prosecutor then embarked on a different line of

questioning. (Tr., p.1479, Ls.11-14.)
On appeal, Navarrete contends the district court erred in denying his motion
for a mistrial, claiming, "because the improper questioning went to the heart of Mr.
Navarrette's defense - his alibi, the corrective instruction was insufficient and a
mistrial should have been granted." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) However, applying the

14

appropriate standards to the facts of this case, Navarrete has failed to establish
reversible error in the district court's decision to deny his motion for a mistrial.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial, the question

on appeal is not whether the district court reasonably exercised its discretion in light
of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. State v. Barcella, 135
Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). The question is "whether the
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been
denied in a criminal case, the abuse of discretion standard is a misnomer."

~

The

district court's "refusal to declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident,
viewed retrospectively, constituted reversible error." !Q. Therefore, a conviction will
not be set aside for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having
changed the results of the trial. State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359, 367-368, 972 P.2d
737, 745-7 46 (Ct. App. 1998). The test for harmless error is whether the appellate
court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial would not
have been different absent the improper testimony. J.g_. at 368, 972 P.2d at 746.

C.

The District Court Properly Denied Navarrete's Motion for A Mistrial
In the context of the entire record, the prosecutor's question does not amount

to reversible error, but is a defect that has little, if any, likelihood of having changed
the result of the trial.
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The admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the
declaration of a mistrial. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 125 Idaho 266, 269, 869 P.2d
583, 586 (Ct. App. 1994).
irregularity,

Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides "[a]ny error, defect,

or variance which

does not affect substantial

rights shall be

disregarded." Therefore, a new trial is unnecessary if the error was harmless. State
v. Scovell, 136 Idaho 587, 593, 38 P.3d 625, 631 (Ct. App. 2001).

"The test for

harmless error ... is whether a reviewing court can find beyond a reasonable doubt
that the jury would have reached the same result without the admission of the
challenged evidence."

State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181

(1998); State v. Slater, 136 Idaho 293, 300, 32 P.3d 685, 692 (Ct. App. 2001). In
addition, it is well established that where improper testimony is introduced into a trial
and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to disregard such evidence, it is
ordinarily presumed that the jury obeyed the court's instruction entirely. See State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768 P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Boothe, 103
Idaho 187, 192, 646 P.2d 429, 434 (Ct. App. 1982). No less an authority than the
United States Supreme Court has proclaimed:
We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard
inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an
'overwhelming probability' that the jury will be unable to follow the
court's instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of the
evidence would be 'devastating' to the defendant.
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8 (1987). Therefore, the presumption is that the
jury in Navarrete's case followed the district court's instruction to disregard the
improper question when she struck it from the record. Navarrete bears the burden
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of demonstrating an overwhelming probability that the jury would not be able to
follow the district court's instruction to ignore the question, and that such probability
was likely devastating to Navarrete's defense.
Navarrete has failed to meet his burden on appeal.

The prosecutor's

question went unanswered, so there was no improper testimony heard by the jury.
The district court struck the question from the record and instructed the jury "not to
give it any consideration." (Tr., p.1479, Ls.3-7.) Moreover, the court instructed the
jury in its preliminary instructions:
In determining the facts you may consider only the evidence
admitted during the trial. ...
. . . At times during the trial an objection may be made to
question asked a witness or to a witness's answer or to an exhibit. ...
If I sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness may
not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not
attempt to guess what the answer might have been or the exhibit
would have shown. Similarly, if I tell you not to consider a particular
statement or exhibit, you should put it out of your mind and not refer to
it or rely on it in your later deliberations.
(Tr., p.362, L.18 - p.363, L.14; see R., p.154 (Jury Instr. No. 5).)

The court's

instruction to the jury, coupled with the fact that the question was unanswered and
the prosecutor pursued a new line of questioning upon the jury's return, was
sufficient to safeguard against any consideration of the improper question.

On

appeal, the court "presume[s] that a jury obeyed the trial court's instructions to
disregard an improper question and to avoid speculation as to what the witness
might have answered if permitted to do so." State v. Owens, 101 Idaho 632, 639,
619 P.2d 787, 794 (1980) (citations omitted). Navarrete has failed to show in any

17

way that the jury would be unable to follow the instruction not to consider the
unanswered question
Furthermore, in viewing the entire record as a whole, there is no indication
that the prosecutor's question would have affected the guilty verdict; the jury would
have returned the same guilty verdict had it not heard the question. A review of the
trial record shows the evidence demonstrating Navarrete's guilt was, to say the
least, overwhelming.
Elizabeth Chinea ("Liz'') and Jennifer Israel testified that they were present at
the trailer and personally saw Navarrete shoot Irving Romero in the back.

(Tr.,

p.676, L.13 - p.677, L.25; 753, L.3 - p.754, L.8.) Holly Peterson testified that she
was standing in the driveway of her mobile home park trailer with Liz and saw
Navarrete ("Wedo") pushing Romero out the front door of the mobile home; when
Romero jumped off the porch, she turned around and heard a gunshot go off, then
ran down the street with Liz to a neighbor's house. (Tr., p.927, L.14 - p.929, L.25.)
Jessie Salinas testified that he, Mike Stolp, and Navarrete drove to Holly
Peterson's Garden City trailer on October 19, 2009, and upon arrival, Stolp and
Navarrete went to the back room of the trailer where Romero was lying in bed. (Tr.,
p.1507, L.8- p.1508, L.22.) Salinas explained that after he went back outside and
talked to Liz and Holly in the driveway for a few minutes, he walked toward the front
door, but when he got to the bottom of the steps (Tr., p.1509, L.6 - p.1510, L.8),
-- the main door slammed open and that screen door comes open and
Irving runs out and hits me with his shoulder. And I kind of step back
and I look at him. And when I look at him I heard a gunshot.
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(Tr., p.1510, Ls.11-15.) Salinas further testified that Stolp followed Romero out the
front door, but he could not see inside the trailer to be able to see who was behind
Stolp.

(Tr., p.1511, Ls.12-18.)

When the gunshot went off, Salinas saw Stolp

standing on the edge of the stairs with his hands in the air. (Tr., p.1512, Ls.8-16.)
The three - Navarrete, Stolp, and Salinas - drove together in Stolp's truck to
Salinas's mother's house, and Navarrete and Stolp left that house together in Stolp's
Camara because his truck was running out of gas. (Tr., p.1512, L.20-p.1513, L.14;
p.1583, L.4 - p.1584, L.18.)
Stolp testified that, just before the shooting, he was walking in front of
Romero as they were leaving the trailer with Navarrete behind Romero, and when
Stolp got to the front door, Romero pushed him into the doorjamb and a shot
simultaneously went off, startling Stolp and causing him to put his hands in the air.
(Tr., p.1578, L.14 - p.1579, L.7; p.1581, Ls.3-23.)

When Stolp looked around,

Navarrete was still inside the trailer. (Tr., p.1582, Ls. 8-10.)
Janet Wallace, a sometimes intimate friend of Navarrete's (Tr., p.872, L.22 p.873, L.21 ), testified that Navarrete admitted to her that he shot Romero because
Romero was "passing around pictures on the phone," and was "talking shit about
him leaving messages and that his main reason was because he called him a punk
bitch" (Tr., p.883, Ls.16-25).
Dan Brown, a friend who grew up with Navarrete in Parma (Tr., p.825, L.4 p.826, L.2), testified that Navarrete called him about 11 :00 or 11 :30 (on Monday,
October 19, 2009) and asked him to go into Navarrete's garage and "push some
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stuff around so we can fit two cars in there, and turn on the TV and watch the news
and scanner" (Tr., p.828, L.12 - p.829, L.24). When Navarrete arrived at his house
about ten minutes later (in a Camaro and with a young male), he threw a pistol onto
his bed, said it kept jamming, and asked Brown if he could clean it for him. (Tr.,
p.832, L.6 - p.833, L.19.)

As Brown was washing the pistol in the bathroom,

Navarrete called him back into the bedroom where the TV was showing a breaking
story about a shooting in Garden City.

(Tr., p.833, L.21 - p.834, L.13.)

Brown

asked Navarrete if he knew what he had done, and if he knew what he had gotten
himself into, and Navarrete said "no."

(Tr., p.836, L.17- p.837, L.6.)

Because

Brown's "gut told [him] that [Navarrete] had did [sic] something with it," he asked
Navarrete if he knew "how to take care of [the pistol] so it couldn't be traced back to
him."

(Tr., p.837, Ls.11-15.)

When Navarrete responded "no," Brown "took a

screwdriver, run [sic] it down the barrel, try messing [sic] up the rifling." (Tr., p.837,
Ls.17-23.) Brown loaded several tote bags of Navarrete's belongings into Brown's
vehicle (a van), which they agreed would be kept at Brown's house until Navarrete
picked them up after he was ready to go to Las Vegas. (Tr., p.839, Ls.5-18.) As
Brown shook Navarrete's hand when he walked out of the house, Navarrete told
Brown, "I got him," which Brown thought related to the news story he had seen. (Tr.,
p.839, L.21 - p.840, L.3.)
On his way home, Brown noticed one of the tote bags had fallen onto the floor
of his van and opened up, exposing the pistol. (Tr., p.840, Ls.7-10.) Once he was
home, Brown placed the pistol back into the tote bag, and took all four or five of the
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tote bags into his home. (Tr., p.840, L.20 - p.841, L.15.) Navarrete later contacted
Brown and told him he would pick up his belongings on Tuesday morning (October
20, 2009), but after he failed to show up, Brown removed the pistol out of one of the
tote bags, and took it to his work and placed it in a hole ("like a ground squirrel hole")
in the back of the gravel pit.

(Tr., p.845, L.14 - p.846, L.23.)

On Wednesday,

October 21, 2009, detectives with the Garden City Police Department contacted
Brown, who led them to the pistol at the gravel pit.

(Tr., p.1038, L.13 - p.1045,

L.16.) According to Stuart Jacobson, a forensic scientist with the Idaho State Police
Forensic Services, a spent bullet shell casing found lying on the ground next to the
trailer steps was fired by the same pistol that Navarrete gave to Brown, and which
was recovered from the gravel pit. (Tr., p.410, Ls.17-21; p.1041, L.2- p.1055, L.21;
p.1236, L.11-p.1240, L.3; p.1274, Ls.19-24; p.1343, L.25-p.1344, L.9.)
In sum, the evidence presented at trial showing Navarrete's guilt was
mountainous - Elizabeth Chinea and Jennifer Israel saw Navarrete shoot Romero in
the back; Holly Peterson, Jessie Salinas, and Mike Stolp testified that, although they
did not see the gun actually fire, Navarrete was not only present at the scene, but
was either seen right behind Romero when he was shot in the back, or (if not seen)
was still in the trailer at the time; Navarrete admitted to Janet Wallace and Dan
Brown that he shot Romero; and, the bullet shell casing found at the scene was fired
from the pistol Navarrete gave to Brown and asked him to clean after the shooting.
Viewed retrospectively, the single unanswered question by the prosecutor does not
constitute reversible error.

Pecor, 132 Idaho at 367-368, 972 P.2d at 745-746.
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Based on the amount of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, this Court can
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of Navarrete's trial would not
have been different absent the improper question. !,Q. at 368, 972 P.2d at 746. The
district court correctly denied Navarrete's motion for a mistrial.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's denial of
Navarrete's motion for a continuance of his jury trial and his motion for mistrial on
murder in the second degree and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
DATED this 12th day of October, 2011.
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